Tag Archives: statistics

“What Worries Me (Most) About Sexual Assault Prosecutions”

May 25, 2021 Efrayim Moldofsky 2 Comments

I recently watched OsgoodePD’s 2021 Symposium on Sexual Assault available here – not inexpensive, but quite worthwhile. I enjoyed most of it. My favourite part was by far the “debate” between Professor Melanie Randall (“Randall”) and Alan Gold. Randall is a law professor out of Western, and Gold is a legendary criminal defence lawyer (and prolific criminal law author) based in Toronto. The format is essentially each gave a monologue of about 10 minutes about “what worries me about sexual assault prosecutions.” Each had very different views – both were very critical of what passes for our criminal justice system in the area of sexual assault, but for predictably very divergent reasons. I thought Randall’s screed was so useful in that it encapsulates everything that is actually wrong with our system. I suggest her monologue should be made freely and publicly available, and distributed as “Exhibit A” of everything wrong with criminal justice in Canada. I have to say, it was refreshing, as she was far clearer about her concerns than other academics, as I’ve mentioned here.

The main problem with her monologue is her continued insistence on the “pernicious myth” that women “routinely” lie about sexual assault – which is, in her view, not only empirically wrong but also conceptually incoherent (4:38). This is all I really need to know. Why is that a myth, and where is this clear social science evidence showing that it is empirically wrong? I’ll wait. In the meantime, here’s an excellent blog post casting doubt on her baseless assertion (also Wikipedia directly contradicts the claim). More importantly, it is utterly irreconcilable with the presumption of innocence. See how this approach is indirectly “debunked” nicely by the great Paciocco JA recently in R. v. JC, 2021 ONCA 131 as follows, paras. 88-89, emphasis added:

It is dangerous for a trial judge to find relevance in the fact that a complainant has exposed herself to the unpleasant rigours of a criminal trial. As this court said in R. v. G.R.A (1994), 1994 CanLII 8756 (ON CA), 35 C.R. (4th) 340 (Ont. C.A.), “the fact that a complainant pursues a complaint cannot be a piece of evidence bolstering her credibility. Otherwise it could have the effect of reversing the onus of proof”. Of interest, in R. v. K.(V.) (1991), 1991 CanLII 5761 (BC CA), 68 C.C.C. (3d) 18 (B.C.C.A.), at p. 35, Wood J.A. disapproved of such reasoning because it would itself rest in “gender-related stereotypical thinking” that sexual offence complainants are believable. Such reasoning would be a stereotype because it is a prejudicial generalization that would be available in every case.

The primary concern with using a complainant’s readiness to advance a criminal prosecution is that doing so cannot be reconciled with the presumption of innocence. The trial is to begin on the rebuttable premise that the accused is not guilty, not on the basis that the mere making of a criminal sexual assault allegation favours a finding of guilt: R. v. Stewart (1994), 1994 CanLII 7208 (ON CA), 90 C.C.C. (3d) 242 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 252, leave to appeal refused, [1994] S.C.C.A. No. 290; R. v. Nyznik, 2017 ONSC 4392, 350 C.C.C. (3d) 335, at para. 17.

In any event, even if her claim was both true and appropriate (for the sake of argument alone), it is a stereotype, generalization, and entirely unhelpful in the context of any particular complaint – whether these types of complaints are usually or generally true or not is entirely irrelevant, dangerous, and highly prejudicial to the possibility of a fair trial.

She goes on about “ritualized hostility and sustained attacks on credibility” – as against the complainant only, as if the accused (supposedly presumptively innocent) does not regularly have to endure extremely hostile attacks on his credibility by Crowns who – of course – never “whack” the defendant. Note bad character evidence – regularly and wrongly introduced against the accused and rarely if ever corrected on appeal (see R. v. Z.W.C., 2021 ONCA 116 and R v Stauth, 2021 ABCA 88 – contrary to R v JKED, 2021 ABCA 111). Note that this stuff is usually excused as “context” or “narrative” – which would never fly for s. 276 evidence about the complainant, as I’ve pointed out repeatedly (see here, for example).

She goes on about “repetitive, invasive questions, direct claims that lying, and host of other tactics of intimidation….” There is nothing wrong (generally) with repetitive questioning, other than this academic’s claim otherwise and (perhaps) bad U.S. TV contributing to this erroneous perception. Direct claims of lying are bad? I see – I’m sure the Crown usually accepts everything the accused claims on the stand without a grain of salt (insert sarcasm).

An interesting point she makes is that Judith Herman (?) states if one were intentionally setting up a system for harassing victims, it would look like what we have (paraphrasing). I don’t think Herman is correct, but if she is, maybe court is not a good option altogether. Perhaps the presumption of innocence itself is entirely incompatible with giving the required respect to complainants. Perhaps we should automatically convict (which is pretty close to what already occurs)? Maybe there should another way of investigating, prosecuting, defending, rehabilitating altogether? I don’t know, but I’m certainly open to ideas.

Note a respected lawyer’s recent, public comment that “Public confidence — to the extent that there is any — in the court’s ability to adequately manage sexual assault cases is so fragile as it is,” as I tweeted. Perhaps an entirely new system is required, and pretending to respect both the presumption of innocence and the dignity of the complainant (and of course, the “truth” that “victims” rarely – if ever – lie) is just not working? Note the telling comment of another prominent academic (now judge) that “we have to be as careful as we can to ensure that that price [of the presumption of innocence] is no greater than it has to be” (emphasis added, see here) – see also here. Something to think about for the Supreme Court (I will not discuss its latest atrocity in R. v. G.F., 2021 SCC 20 here, other than to link to my Twitter thread on it).

She continues about the “loss of confidence in our criminal justice system” – made popular through the #MeToo movement. Yes. It would be nice if our Courts (Supreme and otherwise), along with academics and practitioners, were less influenced by this stuff – to the direct detriment of the presumption of innocence.

At the risk of repeating myself, the presumption of innocence demands that we believe no witness or charge before trial. If her claim that people don’t lie about this stuff is true, there’s no point in running a trial, and the burden of proof is reversed from the get-go. This is exactly the problem, and one that appears to be entirely missed by these academics and arguably ideological courts (not that they haven’t been made aware of the problem – they simply refuse to acknowledge it, let alone deal with it). Note also that there is (theoretically, anyway) no initial presumption that a witness is telling the truth (R. v. Semple, 2015 ONCA 562, at para. 3).

She makes the very ironic point that law is saturated with psychological assumptions, yet lawyers are “psychologically illiterate”. She fails to note that some areas of law are also saturated with erroneous sociological assumptions – far more dangerous.

The presumption of innocence is hardly mentioned – except in the context that it should not require the presumption of lying on the complainant’s part.

Tellingly, she claims that debate in Parliament about advance notice (of complainant’s communications – s. 278) illustrates this “justice gap”!
She asks rhetorically, “How is argument for necessity of ambush at trial any different than claiming defence should have right to catch them in a lie?” It’s not! It’s “problematically predicated on assumption that SA complainants routinely lie” – maybe or maybe not, but they certainly sometimes lie. Your presumption that they never do is precisely what is problematic – especially if the presumption of innocence is not mere BS that judges go on about before convicting. My favourite part is perhaps 4:41 – “every reform on behalf of complainants is met with serious pushback from the defence bar” – if only!

She quotes Janine Benedet, “anytime accused argues consent, he is saying the complainant is a liar.” CORRECT! I thought the presumption of innocence was a thing – in some countries at some points in history, anyway. Of course, presumably, if the defence is it never happened, he’s also claiming the complainant’s a liar. I guess anything other than a quick, remorseful guilty plea – followed by a very harsh sentence to reflect denunciation and deterrence, is entirely inconsistent with her worldview?

This is blatant #MeToo. We should at least be honest – go straight to sentence. Don’t waste time, effort and your client’s funds banging your head against the wall (if you have the misfortune of being accused or defence counsel) by bringing a s. 276 application, a s. 278 “reverse disclosure” application, mounting any other kind of defence, or arguing about consent or honest but mistaken belief. Go to jail – go directly to jail. Hope for some leniency on a guilty plea. You are obviously guilty (by the nature of the charges) so stop wasting our time (at both trial and if you have the audacity to – gasp! – challenge your conviction on appeal) – an approach that is unfortunately mirrored at our appellate courts – most notably our highest Court in Ottawa. If you get killed in jail by virtue of being called a “skinner” that’s just too bad.

Alan Gold’s rebuttal is pretty solid, considering “the circumstances.” He points out that sexual assault laws are now ridiculously complicated, moreso than tax law. He raises specific concerns with the focus and laws themselves. He points out (at 4:50) that defence rarely questions the credibility of a complainant – merely her reliability – in other words, they rarely call her a liar. I don’t blame him for taking this defensive stance, but I think it’s wrong – credibility is usually the main issue, and being afraid to call the complainant a liar is one of the main problems I think I’ve addressed.

He points out the problem of assuming the conclusion (I think “affirming the consequent”?) when we assume that delay in calling police, for example, is indicative of trauma, when the event itself having occurred may be what’s at question. He also deals with relevance and specific stereotypes, as does Randall. He closes by pointing out that more education of the bar is needed – not incorrect, but it does not confront the actual problem (not that it’s an easy fix). The laws are a mess and are themselves the problem, and our society’s and profession’s refusal to deal with this fiasco is a bigger problem.

Law Blog

Prior consistent statements, bad character, s. 276, rape myths and conviction rates

September 15, 2020 Efrayim Moldofsky 2 Comments

I thought I’d address some common problems in litigation of sexual offence charges. The most common problems, I’d suggest, are prior consistent statements, bad character evidence, and a presumption of truthfulness (explicitly stated or otherwise) being ascribed to the complainant. I’ll discuss these – along with concerns about s. 276 and conviction rates – below.

Prior consistent statements

The law on this is confusing and constantly misunderstood. The idea is that prior consistent statements of a witness are not supposed to be used by the trier of fact to support the credibility of the witness. How about if inconsistencies are an issue during cross-examination of the complainant? R. v. N.W., 2018 ONSC 774 (CanLII) suggests it’s still not allowed; also see here. Note the improper use of prior consistent statements noted in the following recent appellate decisions: R. v. G.J.S., 2020 ONCA 317 (CanLII); R. v. D.K., 2020 ONCA 79 (CanLII); R. v. A.V., 2020 ONCA 58 (CanLII); and R. v. A.S., 2020 ONCA 229 (CanLII).

However, perhaps this is unfair? Inconsistencies can be used to show a lack of credibility and/or reliability of the witness (e.g. inconsistencies in witnesses’ statements can be a sign of poor reliability – per Brown and Witkin’s 2^nd edition of Prosecuting and defending sexual offence cases, 2020 – Alberta Law Libraries e-book link, at pp. 205-6.), so why can’t consistencies be used to show the reverse? I think it’s fair, as we’re trying to be fair to the accused, and the accused is generally the one who gains by the rule against prior consistent statements. In any event, the above cases appear to state that this is the law. If it is a “one-way street”, that’s not necessarily problematic.

However, it appears that some courts have struggled with this concept – of the defence having it “both ways”. See R v Griffin, 2018 ABCA 277 (CanLII):

[33] Neither does the record support the appellant’s argument that the trial judge used Taylor’s prior consistent statements to bolster her credibility. As stated in R v Lavallee, 2015 ABCA 288 at paragraph 22:

The defence cannot have it both ways. It cannot argue at trial that a complainant’s various accounts of what happened are inconsistent, and therefore, unreliable – compelling the court to look at them – and then argue on appeal, once this argument has been rejected, that the court erred by considering the consistency of the statements for the purposes of assessing the reliability of the complainant’s evidence.

I’m frankly confused.

Bad character evidence

Another issue is bad character evidence of the accused. The Crown might be tempted to lead evidence of a history of rape by the accused toward the complainant, or a variety of other negative background details (i.e. never helped around the house, never had a job, didn’t take out garbage, didn’t pay bills, bad father, etc.). These would be helpful in terms of the context of the relationship. However, many (if not most) of these types of details should be inadmissible as bad character evidence. Further, some of this (e.g. history of rape) is also evidence of prior sexual activity, which would be barred if led by the defence absent a s. 276 application – of course, no two-way street there, as the Crown is able to adduce this evidence – pre-Barton, anyway (constitutional problem right there, methinks).

In terms of bad character evidence, see the classic Paciocco/Stuesser text: The Law of Evidence, Irwin Law, Toronto, 2015 (7^th edition) – Alberta Law Libraries e-book; 8^th edition recently released, at (pp. 56-57):

The Exclusion of General Bad Character about the Accused

The Crown cannot call general bad character evidence, being evidence that shows only that the accused is the sort of person likely to commit the offence charged. This rule of exclusion is bolstered by a “prohibited inference.” Even where evidence is admissible for other purposes, if it incidentally exposes the general bad character of the accused, the trier of fact is prohibited by law from inferring that the accused may be guilty because he is the sort of person likely to commit the offence charged .

Naturally, in a criminal prosecution, the Crown can prove the conduct being prosecuted no matter how badly this may reflect on the character of the accused. What the Crown cannot do is lead “extrinsic evidence” – evidence about the accused’s behaviour on other occasions or about his general character – “simply to show that the accused is the sort of person likely to commit the offence charged.” In R. v. Handy, the leading Canadian case on character evidence, Justice Binnie explained this “primary rule of exclusion, “one of the most deeply rooted and jealously guarded principles of our criminal law,” as follows:

Proof of general disposition is a prohibited purpose. Bad character is not an offence known to law. Discreditable disposition or character evidence at large, creates nothing but “moral prejudice” and the Crown is not entitled to ease its burden by stigmatizing the accused as a bad person.

While logically it may be easier to believe that a person of bad character would commit the offence charged – that someone who has burgled before would burgle again – evidence of general disposition is apt to add more heat than light. The trier of fact may convict not because of the natural strength of this kind of evidence, but as a reaction to the discreditable, contemptible, or stigmatizing character of the accused. For these reasons, in spite of its modest relevance, “[i]t is trite law that ‘character evidence [called by the Crown] which shows only that the accused is the type of person likely to have committed the offence in question is inadmissible.” Where the Crown seeks to lead evidence, including by cross-examining the accused, about his extrinsic conduct or his character traits or practices, it is therefore essential to ask the threshold question of whether “the proposed evidence [is] discreditable to the accused ?” If it is, the rule applies. “Bad character evidence” is determined by asking whether the ordinary person would disapprove of the conduct or character revealed. Such conduct or character need not be criminal to engage this rule. Discreditable evidence includes any conduct or information about the accused that others are likely to find to be morally objectionable or apt to demonstrate that he has a contemptible or reprehensible character, and can include activities such as watching pornographic movies or engaging in phone sex. It even extends beyond this to include proof of a stigmatizing condition such as mental illness or alcohol abuse. Historically, it extended to same sex preference but given current attitudes, such evidence should fall outside of the bad character evidence rule, just as evidence of marital infidelity after separation now does.

See also the words of Mitchell J. in R. v. A.B.A., 2018 ONSC 2198 (CanLII), at paras. 30-31:

[…]Mr. A.B.A. admitted to suggestions by Crown counsel that he was of poor, or at the very least, low moral character. Character assassination does not prove his guilt nor does it make him more likely to have sexually assaulted S.B.

Apparently however, this is allowed for “narrative” or “context” when damaging to accused – obviously not for complainant, though, in the s. 276 context. See R. v. F., D.S., 1999 CanLII 3704 (ON CA). Even then, however, require application and limiting instructions to the jury regarding the specific nature of the inferences allowed to be deduced from the evidence. Similarly, R. v. F.(J.E.), 1993 CanLII 3384 (ON CA), which also deals with prior consistent statements, has this to say about bad character evidence:

With respect to this issue, the appellant submits that the evidence of the appellant’s physical abuse of the complainant’s mother was inadmissible. This evidence was clearly admissible because it was witnessed by the complainant and was one reason given by her as justifying her fear of the appellant and her resultant silence about his abuse to her. There should, however, have been a limiting instruction to the jury that this evidence should not be relied upon as proof that the appellant was the sort of person who would commit the offence charged and on that basis infer that the appellant was in fact guilty: see R. v. B.(F.F.), 1993 CanLII 167 (SCC), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 697 at pp. 707-08, 79 C.C.C. (3d) 112 at p. 119.

It appears that this evidence is inadmissible unless specifically for permitted purposes, with appropriate limiting instructions. I’ll admit that I’m confused on this issue, as well.

Rape myths

In a problematic decision – R. v. A.B.A., 2019 ONCA 124 (CanLII), the Ontario Court of Appeal overturned a very solid fact-driven acquittal based on what it perceived to be reliance on rape myths, at para. 17:

The trial judge then went on to explain why she did not believe the complainant, applying the stereotypical views about how victims of sexual assault should behave which have been described above. The trial judge’s determination that she believed the respondent was inextricably linked to her assessment of the complainant’s credibility, which itself was fundamentally affected by legal error.

In yet another disturbing overturning of a solid fact-driven acquittal, the Alberta Court of Appeal found in R v ADG, 2015 ABCA 149 (CanLII), at para. 33:

No inference should be drawn regarding a complainant’s credibility that is based on assumptions about how a victim of sexual assault is supposed to react to the assault. The Supreme Court of Canada has made clear that sexual assault cases should be decided “without resort to folk tales about how abuse victims are expected by people who have never suffered abuse to react to the trauma”: R v Shearing, 2002 SCC 58 at para 121, [2002] 3 SCR 33. There is no inviolable rule on how victims of sexual assault will behave: R v DD, 2000 SCC 43 at para 63, [2000] 2 SCR 275. It cannot be assumed that sexual assault victims will react to abuse in any objectively identifiable way. Findings of credibility should not be affected by the timing of disclosure alone – that is, affected by a comparison between a complainant’s disclosure and the disclosure of a hypothetical ‘objectively reasonable’ victim.

For yet another disturbing overturning a solid fact-driven acquittal (of an unreported decision, reviewed here), which of course, led to serious consequences for the accused and the judge (both of whom I’d categorize as victims in this case), see R v Wagar, 2015 ABCA 327 (CanLII).

Also, see the downright wrong analysis, in yet another overturning of an acquittal (an unreported decision, hence challenging to assess how poor the appellate court’s thought process otherwise was) – R. v A.R.D., 2017 ABCA 237 (CanLII) – appeal to SCC dismissed (para. 39, emphasis added):

The more important question is what, if anything, can evidence of a lack of avoidant behaviour by a complainant tell a trier of fact about a sexual assault allegation? The answer is simple—nothing.

Note also the strong rhetoric in para. 9:

To be clear, reliance on a stereotype to found an assessment of credibility bearing on reasonable doubt is impermissible—it is an error of law. Accordingly, reasonable doubt is not a shield for appellate review if that doubt is informed by stereotypical and therefore prejudicial reasoning. Similarly, to suggest that stereotypical thinking is merely logic or common sense is a licence for it to continue unmasked and unabated. That is why, as a matter of law, this type of reasoning must not be insulated from appellate review.

See the far less problematic approach in the very recently released R. v. Roth, 2020 BCCA 240 (CanLII), at para. 130:

However, this does not mean that the evidence surrounding the driver’s attendance at the home, including the complainant’s conduct during that interaction, was not open for consideration in the credibility assessment and the trial judge was obliged to steer away from it. The risk of myths and stereotypes distorting a judge’s fact‑finding or reasoning process does not prohibit use of a complainant’s behaviour for all analytical purposes (assuming the evidence surrounding that behaviour is properly before the court). Although a piece of evidence may carry the potential for impermissible reasoning, it may also have a permissible role to play as a circumstance to consider in assessing the evidence as a whole, in the context of the case’s particular “factual mosaic”: R. v. D.(D.), 2000 SCC 43 at para. 65; Kiss at paras. 101–102. In my view, what A.R.D. and like cases warn against is the improper use of this type of evidence, not any use at all.

This is a rather “generous” interpretation of ARD. My reading of ARD suggests that it absolutely warns against any use of this evidence – per para. 39, above.

Roth then quotes Dufraimont – thankfully, not Craig or Tanovich. I cite Dufraimont here, in the context of her critique of Craig, and her article can be found here. Dufraimont is more accurate than Craig, but hardly as clear as I’d like, given the popularity of “butchering” the law in this area, as I’ve noted extensively in this post and past posts (para. 131):

On this point, I agree with the comments of professor Lisa Dufraimont in “Myth, Inference and Evidence in Sexual Assault Trials”, (2019) 44 Queen’s L.J. 316 at 353:

Criminal courts … carry the heavy responsibility of ensuring that every accused person has a fair trial. Subject to the rules of evidence and the prohibition of particular inferences, this requires that the defence generally be permitted to bring forward all evidence that is logically relevant to the material issues. Repudiating myths and stereotypes means rejecting certain discriminatory lines of reasoning, but it does not make whole categories of evidence irrelevant or inadmissible. Indeed, sweeping prohibitions that would rule out any consideration of particular forms of evidence are avoided as inconsistent with the accused’s right to make full answer and defence and with our overall approach to finding facts. Outside the prohibited lines of reasoning identified as myths, relevance remains an elastic concept that leaves a wide scope for reasoning from logic and human experience. [Emphasis added; internal references omitted.]

Even better is R. v. J.M., 2018 ONSC 344 (CanLII), wherein Justice Harris says overgeneralization is the problem – but the evidence is not inadmissible; at para. 67 (underlining added)”:

The legal position with respect to delays in disclosure dealt with by the Supreme Court in R. v. D. (D.), 2000 SCC 43, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 275 and as recognized in A.R.D. at para. 55 is analogous. Delays do not automatically count against the complainant’s credibility. This is a serious error of law and is founded on stereotypical thinking. A judge must appreciate the psychology and circumstances that may lead to delayed disclosure. In D. (D.) at para. 65, it was said, and the comments apply equally to association evidence, the reasons for delayed disclosure “are many and at least include embarrassment, fear, guilt, or a lack of understanding and knowledge.” A delay can, however, undoubtedly damage a complainant’s credibility, particularly when disclosure is made coincident with the impetus of a motive to fabricate.

Note also Paciocco’s text (pp. 534-5, emphasis added):

This does not mean that proof relating to a delay in complaining will necessarily be irrelevant and inadmissible. There may be circumstances in the particular case that make it reasonable to expect that had the sexual assault occurred, the complainant would have said so earlier. Where this is so, it remains proper to cross-examine the complainant about the failure to make a timely complaint. […]

S. 276 and conviction rates

In R. v. Seaboyer; R. v. Gayme, 1991 CanLII 76 (SCC), the majority of the Supreme Court struck down s. 276 which – at the time – excluded any evidence of prior sexual activity of the complainant. Apparently, the impugned provisions were in place for 8 years at that point. The majority of the SCC realized (after nearly a decade, anyway) that this was a major problem in terms of trial fairness to the accused. Unfortunately, the majority only struck it down to the extent that it had been a blanket exclusion – it subsequently still required a voir dire to determine the purpose of the evidence and to allow the judge to determine whether the evidence was problematic due to the “twin myths”. Parliament had the sense to adopt this revised version in its reworked version of s. 276 in 1992 rather than allow s. 276 to disappear like other archaic legislation, which is largely what we continue to be stuck with today. This is better than what had previously been the law, but it remains highly problematic. Why is all of this evidence presumptively inadmissible until the accused can prove that it’s necessary? Why not have no such rule, and simply require the judge to exclude the evidence if it appears to be supportive of the twin myths? Kind of how “myths and stereotypes” are supposed to be approached – carefully, but evidence that there was a delay in disclosure is neither presumptively inadmissible nor irrelevant.

In practice, Crowns and courts typically object strenuously to any defence-led evidence about the sexual relationship of the accused and complainant – even when it’s obviously for context only. Context appears to be necessary in every other trial – just not defence-led evidence that relates to history of a sexual relationship. Of course, if Crown wants to lead this evidence (and they often do), s. 276 does not bar them from doing so (note ss. 2 of s. 276 in the Criminal Code: “evidence shall not be adduced by or on behalf of the accused”) – although Barton says that they cannot. Seaboyer and s. 276 continue to be highly problematic. Of course, L’Heureux-Dubé’s dissent in Seaboyer was that the blanket exclusion was acceptable, and her problematic approach to criminal law (evidenced clearly in that case) contributed to wrecking the law in this country for more than a decade (e.g. Ewanchuk, Osolin, O’Connor, etc.) and into the foreseeable future.

Later, see R. v. Darrach, 2000 SCC 46 (CanLII), at para. 69:

The right to make full answer and defence, moreover, does not provide a right to cross-examine an accuser.

WTF? Note the majority in R. v. Osolin, 1993 CanLII 54 (SCC):

(1) Cross-examination as a Fundamental Aspect of a Fair Trial

There can be no question of the importance of cross-examination. It is of essential importance in determining whether a witness is credible. Even with the most honest witness cross-examination can provide the means to explore the frailties of the testimony. For example, it can demonstrate a witness’s weakness of sight or hearing. It can establish that the existing weather conditions may have limited the ability of a witness to observe, or that medication taken by the witness would have distorted vision or hearing. Its importance cannot be denied. It is the ultimate means of demonstrating truth and of testing veracity. Cross-examination must be permitted so that an accused can make full answer and defence. The opportunity to cross-examine witnesses is fundamental to providing a fair trial to an accused. This is an old and well established principle that is closely linked to the presumption of innocence. See R. v. Anderson (1938), 1938 CanLII 195 (MB CA), 70 C.C.C. 275 (Man. C.A.); R. v. Rewniak (1949), 1949 CanLII 358 (MB CA), 93 C.C.C. 142 (Man. C.A.); Abel v. The Queen (1955), 1955 CanLII 473 (QC CA), 115 C.C.C. 119 (Que. Q.B.); R. v. Lindlau (1978), 1978 CanLII 2366 (ON CA), 40 C.C.C. (2d) 47 (Ont. C.A.). The importance of the right to cross-examine was well expressed by the Court in the reasons of Ritchie J. in Titus v. The Queen, 1983 CanLII 49 (SCC), [1983] 1 S.C.R. 259, at pp. 263-64. There he wrote:

I think it essential to stress the purpose for which the cross- examination is permitted, namely, in order that the defence may explore to the full all factors which might expose the frailty of the evidence called by the prosecution. That the accused as he stands in the prisoner’s box on trial for murder is deemed to be innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt is one of the fundamental presumptions inherent in the common law and as such the accused is entitled to employ every legitimate means of testing the evidence called by the Crown to negative that presumption and in my opinion this includes the right to explore all circumstances capable of indicating that any of the prosecution witnesses had a motive for favouring the Crown.

In R. v. Seaboyer, 1991 CanLII 76 (SCC), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577, it was once again emphasized that the right to cross-examine constitutes a principle of fundamental justice that is critical to the fairness of the accused’s trial. In that case, the right to cross-examine was placed in the context of the right to make full answer and defence (at p. 608, per McLachlin J.):

The right of the innocent not to be convicted is dependent on the right to present full answer and defence. This, in turn, depends on being able to call the evidence necessary to establish a defence and to challenge the evidence called by the prosecution.

In short, the denial of the right to call and challenge evidence is tantamount to the denial of the right to rely on a defence to which the law says one is entitled. The defence which the law gives with one hand, may be taken away with the other. Procedural limitations make possible the conviction of persons who the criminal law says are innocent. Cross-examination is all the more crucial to the accused’s ability to make full answer and defence when credibility is the central issue in the trial. Such was the finding made by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Anandmalik (1984), 6 O.A.C. 143, at p. 144:

In a case where the guilt or innocence of the [accused] largely turned on credibility, it was a serious error to limit the [accused] of his substantial right to fully cross-examine the principal Crown witness. It would not be appropriate in the circumstances to invoke or apply the curative provisions of s. 613(1)(b)(iii).

The same point was made by the Alberta Court of Appeal in R. v. Giffin (1986), 1986 ABCA 107 (CanLII), 69 A.R. 158, at p. 159:

We agree …that the events about which counsel sought to cross-examine were relevant on the question of the credibility of the witness …. The accused in this case cannot be said to have had an opportunity for a fair answer and defence when he was not permitted to ask them.

To the same effect is R. v. Wallick (1990), 1990 CanLII 11128 (MB CA), 69 Man. R. (2d) 310 (C.A.), where at p. 311 it was said:

Cross-examination is a most powerful weapon of the defence, particularly when the entire case turns on credibility of the witnesses. An accused in a criminal case has the right of cross-examination in the fullest and widest sense of the word as long as he does not abuse that right. Any improper interference with the right is an error which will result in the conviction being quashed.

Thus it can be seen that the right to cross-examine has always been held to be of fundamental importance in a criminal trial. That right is now protected by ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter. As a result it should be interpreted in the “broad and generous manner befitting its constitutional status” (see R. v. Potvin, 1989 CanLII 130 (SCC), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 525, at p. 544).

Professor Sankoff’s recent text, The Law of Witnesses and Evidence in Canada (formerly “Witnesses”) published by Thomson Reuters (Alberta Law Libraries e-book link) has a thorough, excellent treatment of s. 276 in Ch. 12 (see 12.3 – (iv) — The Test for Admissibility: Section 276(2)) – quoting from Chapter 12.4:

Each of these examples would have to be excluded if s. 276(1) were to be read literally. It is fortunate, thus, that most of the courts that have directly considered the matter have adopted Paciocco’s approach, and the Supreme Court, in the process of dismissing a constitutional challenge to the legislation in R. v. Darrach, appears to have implicitly done so as well. In rejecting the accused’s claim in that case that the operation of s. 276(1) would inevitably lead to the exclusion of probative evidence relating to consent, Gonthier J. wrote that:

Far from being a “blanket exclusion”, s. 276(1) only prohibits the use of evidence of past sexual activity when it is offered to support two specific, illegitimate inferences. These are known as the “twin myths”… If evidence of sexual activity is proffered for its non-sexual features, such as to show a pattern of conduct or a prior inconsistent statement, it may be permitted.

It follows that prior sexual history evidence can be offered to rebut claims of consent or to impeach credibility, so long as this is done directly, rather than by making a contention based on the complainant’s character.

He points out that ambiguity in s. 276 (“by reason of the sexual nature of that activity, the complainant[…] is more likely to have consented to the sexual activity that forms the subject-matter of the charge”), which is generally (hopefully) interpreted in the manner suggested by Paciocco and that is relatively favourable to the defence (that evidence not directly related to the twin myths is admissible – after an accused’s s. 276 application, of course), while others, of course, would prefer a “L’Heureux-Dubé – style” blanket exclusion, with or without an application.

Conviction rates

Craig notes a “profoundly dysfunctional legal system” (in her book, at p. 22, reviewed here), and low conviction rates. Note Tanovich’s influential 2015 article, “Whack” No More: Infusing Equality into the Ethics of Defence Lawyering in Sexual Assault Cases, 2015 CanLIIDocs 164, available here, at p. 503 (my review here):

In addition, heightened zeal has ramifications rarely seen in other cases. These collateral consequences include under-reporting for fear of being “whacked,” secondary trauma to complainants and low conviction rates.

While I was reviewing Tanovich, I noticed this disturbing footnote commenting on (at p. 504):

Defence counsel wanted to use the painting “to make the point that the theme of false accusation is not the exclusive invention of criminal defence lawyers.”37

Ibid. at para 2. If anything, given the reluctance of women to report sexual assault and the fear of being violated and humiliated in court, it is hard to imagine why someone would bring a false claim. This point is made by Justice L’Heureux-Dubé in Osolin SCC, supra note 4 at 625, where she notes that, “[t]here is absolutely no evidence to suggest that false allegations are more common in sexual assaults than in other offences; indeed, given the data indicating the strong disincentives to reporting, it seems much more likely that the opposite is true.” See also, Sampert, supra note 28 at 307–11 where Professor Sampert notes that one of the myths surrounding sexual assault that is often portrayed in the media is that “innocent men are regularly accused of sexual assault and women regularly lie about it.” This is not to suggest that there are not wrongful sexual assault convictions, but there is little, if any, evidence that this concern extends beyond cases that turn on identification evidence—that is, where the issue is not consent nor whether the act occurred, but whether, in fact, it was the accused who assaulted the complainant. In this category of sexual assault cases, the concerns with “whacking” rarely arise since the focus is not on making the complainant out to be a liar but with whether that identification is mistaken.

This horses**t passing for “expertise” in social science and/or evidence and law is simply ridiculous. I’ve addressed this previously here. Tanovich is dead wrong about this. There are countless wrongful convictions on a regular basis – in part due to butchering of the law thanks to “scholarship” such as his (and that of Craig and L’Heureux-Dubé, etc.), and in part due to the fact that complainants lie. Mistaken identification is probably rarer than both of those scenarios (consent and whether the act occurred). The fact that complainants lie should not be a rape myth – it’s a plain fact, and one that’s borne out by statistics – since we’re so concerned about statistics. Besides – isn’t it a myth and stereotype that women don’t lie about these complaints, and/or that it’s “hard to imagine why they would bring a false claim”? I get affirmative action, but let’s not use it to secure wrongful convictions and promote outdated, archaic, and stereotypical thinking.

I’ve discussed statistics previously here, which tend to show weaknesses in the assertions of L’Heureux-Dubé and Tanovich. Further, there is a plethora of social science research documenting the extremely common false allegations of child sexual abuse in divorce/separation cases. One does not have to be a Mensa scholar to infer that it’s not merely false allegations of child sexual abuse that are being concocted in those cases.

Besides, as Greenspan points out, the question “why would a woman lie about rape?” is silly and misleading, and no more appropriate nor relevant than “why would a man rape?” or “why do people commit crimes?” or “why is the sky blue”? Of course, however, it’s a much more dangerous question, given that it’s used to insinuate that complainants – in a particular kind of case – are being truthful.

Note that it is wrong to presume that witnesses are being truthful and accurate in their testimony (R. v. Thain, 2009 ONCA 223 (CanLII), at para. 32, cited in Paciocco at p. 534, footnote 1). This is distinct from the concept that the witness herself (not her evidence) is presumed to be of good character and truthful (ibid., citing R. v. Giraldi (1975), 28 C.C.C. (2d) 248 (B.C.C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused (1975), 28 C.C.C. (2d) 248n (S.C.C.)).

Of course, s. 276 assumes that it will “encourage the reporting of sexual offences” – as if this were a fact. I’m surprised it doesn’t add the tantalizing expectation of higher conviction rates, the reduced likelihood of “whacking the victim”, and rehabilitating our “dysfunctional legal system,” for good measure.

It is partly due to some of the “scholarship” mentioned above (that is irresponsible at best) that a male victim (wrongfully accused of sexual assault) has a better chance at a fair trial in China or Russia than in Canada from 1983 onward.

Law Blog

More Recent Wrongful Sexual Assault Convictions

August 18, 2020 Efrayim Moldofsky 3 Comments

In R v ADG, 2015 ABCA 149 (CanLII), a sex assault acquittal was overturned (surprisingly, the ABCA didn’t “fossick guilt from a fact-driven acquittal”, to borrow the glorious prose of McClung J.A. in R. v. Ewanchuk, 1998 ABCA 52 (CanLII) at para. 9). This was due to a reliance on rape myths by the lower court judge – Justice Yamauchi. This is a ridiculous (but not surprising result), as the acquittal was based on very solid concerns with the testimony of the complainants, as is obvious when one reads the excellent reasons for the trial judge’s decision: R v ADG, 2013 ABQB 724 (CanLII). Of course, even a hint of a stereotype-based acquittal is enough to send the Alberta Court of Appeal into a frenzy, and into ordering a new trial. Not surprisingly, in the retrial, the accused was found guilty of (only) most of the allegations. Even less surprisingly, the ABCA refused to overturn that decision, despite numerous concerns with it (R v Griffin, 2018 ABCA 277 (CanLII)). Unfortunately, the decision on retrial was not reported, so it is difficult to determine how bad the errors in it were by reading the ABCA decision alone. Note also the intense media circus around these decisions. I’d be surprised if anyone was talking about investigating the judge’s conduct in the retrial for his mistakes that hurt the accused. Of course, the judge on the first trial acquitting is the basis for complaints and griping about needs for more “diversity” on the bench, and – wouldn’t you know it – better judicial education. It’s a shame that a judge (Judge Camp comes to mind) may lose his/her job for a fact-driven acquittal that is largely unproblematic from a legal perspective and is generally pilloried by appeal courts for the slightest hint of stereotypical thinking (which of course, will justify overturning an otherwise-solid fact-driven acquittal), while a wrongful conviction (one that is blatantly wrong or relies on very weak evidence) rarely leads to any kind of sanction – by the courts, press, public, or anyone else. Instead, the Courts of Appeal (e.g. Alberta’s) generally gleefully uphold the conviction, finding typically that they would simply be loath to intervene with the trial judge’s assessment of credibility and the evidence, etc. – e.g. R v SMC, 2020 ABCA 19 (CanLII – far be it from them to interfere with exercises of judicial discretion and judgment) and the next case discussed: A.B.A. In the event that a conviction is overturned, I’m unaware of a case where a judge faced any kind of sanction or repercussion (I’m not sure that they should – absent the fact that they often would if it had been an acquittal that was overturned). Oh, and haven’t I mentioned, the presumption of innocence is alive and well in our Canadian criminal justice system.

For another disturbing overturning of a fact-driven acquittal, see a recent decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal: R. v. A.B.A., 2019 ONCA 124 (CanLII) – not surprisingly not including Doherty, Watt, Paciocco, or Trotter, etc., where the ONCA overturns a very solid fact-based acquittal due to – you guessed it – myths and stereotypes. Unfortunately, it’s cited uncritically in Brown and Witkin’s recently-released 2^nd edition of Prosecuting and defending sexual offence cases (Toronto: Emond Publishing, 2020 – Alberta Law Libraries e-book link) [“Brown/Witkin”] at p. 215. It points out (rightly), at para. 4:

[4] The Crown’s right of appeal from an acquittal is limited to a question of law alone: R. v. J.M.H., 2011 SCC 45, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 197, at para. 39.

Then see paras. 10-11, which is a gross “straw man” and oversimplification (bordering on outright misrepresentation) of the trial judge’s analysis:

[10] Inherent in this approach is a comparison of the complainant’s behaviour to what the trial judge viewed was “appropriate” behaviour that the trial judge would have expected of an adult threatened with a sexual assault or a victim of sexual assault. The issue here was not what steps the complainant should have taken to protect herself, but, rather, whether she consented to sexual activity with the respondent.

[11] The complainant testified that she was afraid of the respondent after he sexually assaulted her. The trial judge found that the complainant’s conduct after the assault, which included continued association with the respondent and failure to flee or call out for help when possible, undermined her evidence, again measured against how the trial judge would have reasonably expected her to behave. She stated, “Aside from the alleged rape, there is no evidence to support a finding that her fear existed or if it existed was reasonable in the circumstances.”

Thankfully, the lower court acquittal (by Mitchell J.) included written reasons – R. v. A.B.A., 2018 ONSC 2198 (CanLII):

[22] I am mindful that the expectation of how a victim of sexual assault will, or should, behave must not be assessed on the basis of stereotypes, generalizations and myths. Having said that, the behaviour of the complainant occurring after the first incident causes me to approach her evidence with extreme caution skepticism. Her admitted conduct following the first incident and surrounding the later incidents on August 1 and 2, 2015 is, at the very least, inconsistent with her testimony that she was scared and intimidated by the accused.

No fewer than 16 bullet points in para. 25 describe behaviour of the complainant that was inconsistent with her claims.

See also para. 26:

[26] The basic theme underpinning S.B.’s testimony was that she has never had any sexual attraction towards Mr. A.B.A. because he was her sister’s husband. She testified that she was sickened by the assaults. She testified that she simply went along with whatever he requested of her because she was terrified of and intimidated by him and he scared her. Her testimony is circular. To find her evidence that she was scared and frightened of Mr. A.B.A. credible, the court must first find she was raped. Aside from the alleged rape, there is no evidence to support a finding that her fear existed or if it existed was reasonable in the circumstances. She admitted, he never threatened her with physical violence at any time or slapped, punched, kicked or hit her as a means of forcing her to engage in sexual activity with him. After the last incident of vaginal intercourse in the bedroom, they snuggled before falling asleep. When they awoke later that morning, she made no attempt to have Mr. A.B.A. leave or leave herself. Instead, made her alleged rapist soup and spent some time knitting before Mr. A.B.A. left on his own accord. This is not the behaviour of an individual who has been brutally sexually assaulted for the past 15 plus hours.

And note the fantastic language in paras. 30-31:

[…]Mr. A.B.A. admitted to suggestions by Crown counsel that he was of poor, or at the very least, low moral character. Character assassination does not prove his guilt nor does it make him more likely to have sexually assaulted S.B.

[31] Similar in vein to the requirement that the court must disabuse itself of stereotypes regarding how victims should behave, so too the courts must be loath to stereotype persons who commit sexual assaults. Merely because Mr. A.B.A. is a 220 pound man with what he claims is an exceptionally large penis and S.B. is a petite woman who presented as mild-mannered in the courtroom, does not make Mr. A.B.A. more likely to have committed the offence with which he has been charged and S.B. to be more likely a victim.

Of course, the acquittal is no doubt very unsafe for this panel of the ONCA (Pardu, MacPherson and Brown JJ.). Had it been the ABCA (or the Supreme Court), the acquittal would likely have been overturned regardless of who was sitting on the panel.

Brown/Witkin is helpful in that it provides decent nuance around rape myths and the fact that they’re generally admissible and their weight is in issue – not their admissibility (see Chapter 7). It fails to criticize the recent SCC trilogy of Barton, Goldfinch, and RV, unfortunately, unlike Sankoff, as I point out here (it’s gratifying to know that there are perhaps at least two lawyers in the country publicly criticizing our sexual assault laws not from the “victim’s” perspective). It also doesn’t challenge the SCC or the state of our laws today, although one can hardly blame them, given that it’s the Supreme Court and decades of law in Canada that they’d need to critique. One quibble in particular: at p. 213, it quotes R. v. Osolin, 1993 CanLII 54 (SCC) to suggest that “there is no evidence or research to suggest that false allegations are more common in sexual assaults than in other allegations.” In dissent in Osolin, L’Heureux-Dubé J. does say:

There is absolutely no evidence to suggest that false allegations are more common in sexual assaults than in other offences; indeed, given the data indicating the strong disincentives to reporting, it seems much more likely that the opposite is true.

That may be the case. I’m not aware of statistics on false reporting for sexual assault being higher than for other crimes, but I’d be shocked if it wasn’t. Have any studies been done on this specific issue? Inquiring minds need to know. Also, as I’ve pointed out previously, 2017 Stats Can data suggest that the number of sexual assault reports classified as unfounded was double the rate of other crimes (and that’s in a year when the rate dropped from 19% to 14% for unfounded sex assault allegations). Now I’ll concede that “unfounded” does not necessarily mean false, but I think L’Heureux-Dubé’s assertion (accepted uncritically by the authors here) is weak – at best. What’s that they say about absence of evidence? See here for more about statistics.

Speaking of evidence, see Lisak, David & Gardinier, Lori & Nicksa, Sarah & Cote, Ashley, (2010) False Allegations of Sexual Assualt: An Analysis of Ten Years of Reported Cases, Violence Against Women, 16, 1318-34 – result is 2-10% of studied allegations of sexual assault were false – see here, p. 1318. It notes that other studies have come up with numbers of between 1.5 to 90% (p. 1319). Obvious concerns with the methodology of the study: it studied only alleged rapes reported to a university police – i.e. the parties were generally all university students (p. 1327). Also, it only counts cases where there is evidence that the report was false (e.g. p. 1318: “To classify a case as a false allegation, a thorough investigation must yield evidence that a crime did not occur”). Of course, that won’t exist in many cases of false reporting, just as reporting of sightings of Sasquatch won’t always have evidence confirming the claims to be false. Certainly, these sloppy social science findings (and assertions) are more than sufficient upon which to base countless wrongful convictions. A quick Wikipedia search is also helpful: note to our Supreme Court. And no, just because the vast majority of rapes may not be reported does not mean that the numbers are different and is not helpful in assessing the actual rate of false reports. For all we know, all of the non-reported rapes are true, and none of the reported ones are. But thanks L’Heureux-Dubé for qualifying yourself as an expert in social science and providing helpful evidence for the rest of us mortals here.

Surprisingly, sex assault convictions overturned in a 2-1 dissent by ABCA: R v Schmaltz, 2015 ABCA 4 (more on this case in a minute) and in R v Quintero-Gelvez, 2019 ABCA 17 (CanLII). In R. v. A.K., 2020 ONCA 435 (CanLII), a conviction was overturned for problematic reasons for disbelieving accused in a sex assault case. See also R. v D.R.S., 2013 ABCA 18 (CanLII) – sex assault conviction overturned after 8 years once complainant recanted – note the smarmy language of the ABCA (at para. 16, emphasis added):

Moreover, it is obviously not the fault of the appellant that he was convicted based on unreliable evidence. Nor is it any criticism of the Crown prosecutor, defence counsel, or the trial judge; it is merely a reflection of the fact that while the Canadian legal system is very good, it is not perfect.

I wouldn’t call it perfect or very good. Particularly in relation to sex assaults, it’s utterly horrendous.

Also, see this thoughtful blog post, and this book review.

Ururyar is an interesting case – it’s mentioned multiple times in Craig’s book (my review here). It’s a disturbing trial decision (a sex assault conviction – R. v. Ururyar, 2016 ONCJ 448 (CanLII), overturned in R. v. Ururyar, 2017 ONSC 4428 (CanLII), where the lower court judge’s reasoning was called “incomprehensible” multiple times (at paras. 57, 62, 64 – at least he didn’t use rape myths, so definitely no CJC complaint is necessary). The Crown – surprise surprise – did not re-prosecute (this wasn’t in Alberta). It appears to have been a blatant wrongful conviction – 4 of 6 grounds of appeal were valid, as well as the problematic and bats**t costs award against the accused (paras. 66-67). See the Star’s coverage here, Blatchford here, and charges dropped (Star). Also, see the Barbra Schlifer Commemorative Clinic’s disturbing press release after the appeal decision (you’ll probably be shocked to learn that they were disappointed with the result!). The impugned judge (Zuker) is apparently a professor at OISE and a judge until 2016. Craig is careful to note in a footnote that the trial decision was subsequently overturned, but “The case is cited here as relevant to the complainant’s experience of the trial process, and not as an endorsement of the trial judge’s reasoning”. Yet she also criticizes defence counsel’s cross-examination of the complainant for relying on the delayed disclosure stereotype (pp. 48-49), which again is not a problem per se – per Sankoff, Brown/Witkin, etc. – it is relevant and admissible, and the weight is the only factor that may be reduced.

She points out (pp. 196-197) that she clearly sides with the minority opinion in Schmaltz (emphasis added, my comments italicized in brackets):

As Justice Paperny demonstrated, that is not what occurred in this case. Take the accused’s argument that Judge Greaves improperly interfered with defence counsel’s ability to cross-examine the complainant as to whether she and Schmaltz had been flirting earlier in the day. The majority of the Court of Appeal concluded that this intervention interfered with cross-examination on a potentially critical ambiguity in the complainant’s statement to the police. Did she tell the police she flirted with him or not? Under Canadian law, whether the complainant was flirting earlier in the evening is irrelevant to the issue of consent [Incorrect – see next note]. Consent to sexual touching must be contemporaneous. It must be given at the time of sexual contact. An accused cannot rely on notions of implied consent or a mistaken belief in implied consent. The allegation in Schmaltz was that he digitally penetrated her vagina while she was asleep. He maintained that she was consenting [and was not sleeping, just to be perfectly clear]. To characterize the presence or absence of flirting earlier in the evening as a critical ambiguity in a case in which the central issue is consent suggests a misunderstanding of the law of consent on the part of the majority of the Court of Appeal [no, it doesn’t – flirting is absolutely relevant to whether or not consent occurred (e.g. see Brown/Witkin at p. 213), and Lisa Dufraimont points out this problem with Craig’s tirade nicely, as I’ve mentioned here. Further, as the majority points out, the much larger issue is credibility, and the trial judge’s interventions with cross-examination that might have shown flaws in credibility if it had not been stopped]. Whether she told the police she was flirting earlier in the evening is only a critical ambiguity if you assume that flirtation earlier in the evening made it more likely she consented to the vaginal penetration later in the evening: an assumption that would be wrong at law [wrong – again]. Indeed, far from being a critical ambiguity, upon a proper application of the law of consent, the ambiguity as to whether there was flirting was “collateral at best and irrelevant on the ultimate issue of consent.” To conclude that judicial intervention to interrupt this line of questioning created the perception of an unfair trial was wrong. As the dissent in Schmaltz correctly noted, the accused’s right to cross-examine a sexual assault complainant is circumscribed by common law rules and by provisions of the Criminal Code, which prohibit evidence of, among other things, a complainant’s sexual history and reputation, as well as irrelevant questions directed to discredited “rape myths” [again, not true – questions that may rely on stereotypes are admissible, and their weight needs to be apportioned carefully – this evidence is not prohibited, it merely may be found to be irrelevant]. The problematic fact that the Crown opened the door to this line of cross-examination by asking the complainant whether there was flirting earlier in the evening (discussed in chapter 5) does not alter the low probative value of the evidence.

Yet the majority of the ABCA decision notes, at para. 47 (emphasis added):

The difficulty however is that, while these issues may have been irrelevant to whether the complainant consented per se, defence counsel’s strategy was to show inconsistencies between the complainant’s trial testimony on these topics and her earlier statements. On these lines of questioning, defence counsel was not propagating rape myths. They were directed not to the issue of consent, but to the issue of credibility, which was central to the accused’s defence.

Note Brown/Witkin, at p. 218 (emphasis added), contradicting Craig’s point that the trial judge is expected to intervene at the slightest hint of cross-examination that may trigger stereotypical thinking:

A trier of fact may rely on the actual conduct of a complainant, witness, or accused in the context of the case being heard, so long as care is taken not to generalize. Evidence that involves how a person reacts to a situation or when a complaint is made, or whether the person engages in post-offence conduct can be helpful in that it informs a finding of credibility, but this evidence should not be assessed based on stereotypical generalizations about how a complainant (or accused) should behave given the nature of the case. Rather, the evidence should be analyzed looking at what is expected of that witness in that case based on his or her characteristics, background, etc. A trier of fact will be on safer ground relying as much as possible on how the person in question generally works, and would be expected to behave, rather than how the world works. Care must be taken to always consider explanations for behaviour and alternative inferences. Undoubtedly, the evidence must be tethered to an evidentiary base.

This is an excellent example of why I simply can’t stand Craig. I promise it would bother me less if she wasn’t cited approvingly by our Supreme Court on a regular basis.

Frankly, the law on stereotypes (e.g. delayed disclosure) is idiotic, and this fact partly (in a circular fashion) absolves Craig and everyone else (including our Supreme Court) of blame for butchering the law as badly as they do: see ADG (emphasis added):

[32] The law is clear that no presumptive adverse inference may be drawn against a complainant who does not disclose sexual abuse immediately. Yet this does not mean that no consideration whatsoever can be given to the timing of the disclosure of abuse: R v TEM, 1996 ABCA 312 at paras 9-11, 187 AR 273, leave to appeal to SCC refused [1997] 2 SCR xv. The importance of delayed disclosure will vary depending on the circumstances of the particular complainant: TEM at para 11. Victims of sexual assault will have different reasons for reporting abuse at different points in time. It is up to finders of fact to evaluate the testimony of complainants and determine their credibility on the basis of all the evidence, including the timing of their disclosure.

[33] No inference should be drawn regarding a complainant’s credibility that is based on assumptions about how a victim of sexual assault is supposed to react to the assault. The Supreme Court of Canada has made clear that sexual assault cases should be decided “without resort to folk tales about how abuse victims are expected by people who have never suffered abuse to react to the trauma”: R v Shearing, 2002 SCC 58 at para 121, [2002] 3 SCR 33. There is no inviolable rule on how victims of sexual assault will behave: R v DD, 2000 SCC 43 at para 63, [2000] 2 SCR 275. It cannot be assumed that sexual assault victims will react to abuse in any objectively identifiable way. Findings of credibility should not be affected by the timing of disclosure alone – that is, affected by a comparison between a complainant’s disclosure and the disclosure of a hypothetical ‘objectively reasonable’ victim.

How on earth is a trial judge (or jury) supposed to reconcile the above 2 consecutive paragraphs? Delayed disclosure is irrelevant except when it isn’t? And if judges are allowed to consider delayed disclosure, why are judges like Yamauchi getting trashed by the ABCA for doing exactly that? If there is no “inviolable rule on how a sexual assault victim will behave”, how the heck is a judge supposed to consider delayed disclosure as a factor at all (preferably without being fired or ripped by the ABCA, the press and academics)? Perhaps a more sensible approach would be one that incorporates some common sense – wait, that’s a rape myth, too.

For further support that what is thought of generally as “myths” are admissible, see R v ADG, 2015 ABCA 149, at para. 32; R. v. J.M., 2018 ONSC 344, at para. 66,; R. v. L.S., 2017 ONCA 685, at para. 89; R. v. T.E.M., 1996 ABCA 312, at para. 11.

Here’s another tragic wrongful conviction: R. v. Howe, 2015 NSCA 84 (CanLII), lower court sentencing decision on QuickLaw – appears to be racially based wrongful conviction – see here. Jury decision where judge fu**ed up terribly (Chief Justice of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court, mind you). Judge apparently very recently retired. Craig mentions it very briefly in her awful book (p. 216):

It is not uncommon for the Crown to decline to prosecute a second time because of a complainant’s unwillingness to endure the distress and disruption of testifying at a retrial.

Endnote 73: For recent examples, see the cases of Lyle Howe (Blair Rhodes, “Halifax Defence Lawyer Lyle Howe Has Sexual Assault Charge Dropped,” CBC News [18 February 2016]) and of Stephen Taweel (Blair Rhodes, “P.E.I. Businessman Stephen Nicholas Taweel Won’t Face Sex Assault Retrial,” CBC News [9 May 2016].

I’m pretty sure the distress and disruption of testifying for the complainant was far from the only reason why the Crown declined to prosecute a second time. Oh, and no comment on the awful lower court (jury) trial, nor any indication of reporting the involved judge to the CJC by any Nova Scotia or Alberta academics for his terrible role in the wrongful conviction – noticing a pattern here?

I’ll note an excellent podcast on a wrongful conviction (I think it included charges of sexual assault, alongside murder): Glen Assoun. It’s an excellent illustration of the problem with our criminal justice system: especially when it is thought of by the public and its actors as a tool to punish “criminals” whose guilt is instantly presumed rather than choosing to fairly and justly determine culpability in the first place and actually honouring the presumption of innocence (of course, ensuring that its “price is no greater than it has to be” – see here). The SCC dismissed the conviction appeal: Glen Eugene Assoun v. Her Majesty the Queen, 2006 CanLII 31717 (SCC), upholding the lengthy appeal court decision of R. v. Assoun, 2006 NSCA 47 (CanLII). Sentencing: R. v. Assoun, 1999 CanLII 2819 (NS SC). It took DNA evidence to exonerate him, and he was not exonerated until March, 2019: see R. v Assoun, 2019 NSSC 220 (CanLII) – after a mere 17 years in prison. Nova Scotia has been called the capital of wrongful convictions in Canada – I’m sure Alberta is not far behind.

For more fun recent wrongful convictions, see paras. 72-73 of R. v. S.S.S., 2020 BCCA 180 (CanLII), where a sex assault conviction was overturned due to the judge’s erroneous conclusion of external inconsistency between the accused’s testimony and that of another witness (emphasis added):

The trial judge’s unforgiving approach to the evidence of the appellant in this case contrasted sharply with her more tolerant approach to problems with the evidence of the complainant. It is not necessary, however, to make any determination as to whether the conviction should be overturned on the basis of uneven treatment of evidence. In this case, the judge’s error of principle in respect of “external inconsistencies” in the evidence of the appellant is sufficient to require a new trial.

Also, see R. v. Carbone, 2020 ONCA 394 (CanLII), essentially a dastardly lower court decision where the trial judge effectively reversed the burden of proof – on surprise – a sex assault trial (paras. 30-45).

All this, of course, neatly lines up with the lofty ideal of what we should be able to expect of our judges at all levels; at para. 40 of L’Heureux-Dubé and McLachlin JJ, in R. v. S. (R.D.), 1997 CanLII 324 (SCC) – emphasis added:

The reasonable person, through whose eyes the apprehension of bias is assessed, expects judges to undertake an open-minded, carefully considered, and dispassionately deliberate investigation of the complicated reality of each case before them.

Law Blog

Book Review: Putting Trials on Trial: Sexual Assault and the Failure of the Legal Profession

March 2, 2020 Efrayim Moldofsky 9 Comments

61Ddb8AtgsL I read Professor Elaine Craig’s 2018 book: Putting Trials on Trial: Sexual Assault and the Failure of the Legal Profession a year or so ago, and felt quite unsettled. I wanted to address it in a blog post, but then convinced myself that no one would take the book seriously. I then saw that the Supreme Court of Canada cited it approvingly twice in 2019, and changed my position. I decided to read it again and blog about it.

She gets off to a bad start:

Imagine a society – one that purports to be a rule of law society – in which one segment of the population regularly engages in harmful acts of sexual violation against another segment of the community with almost complete legal immunity. Canada is such a society… (p. 3).

I see – let’s blame the justice system for sexual violence? She immediately follows up with “over ninety percent of sexual assaults in Canada go unreported”. More on this in a minute.

One of the primary sources of data relied upon in this book is trial transcripts:

Transcripts from twenty recent sexual assault trials in Canada were examined…Given the difficulty and expense of securing trial transcripts, I pursued either cases where there was some reference to the length or style of defence counsel’s cross-examination of the complainant in a reported decision… stereotypical thinking had informed the trial judge’s reasoning… The twenty cases for which transcripts were obtained are not relied upon to make assertions about the problematic practices that they arguably reveal. [emphasis added] – pp. 17-18.

This is highly problematic – the author looks at only twenty trial transcripts. She readily admits that she focused on cases where “stereotypical thinking had informed the trial judge’s reasoning”. Despite her assertion that they’re not relied upon to “make assertions about the problematic practices that they arguably reveal” – this is exactly what she tries to do. Even if she didn’t, the fact that she’s looking at only cases that appear to be problematic tells us from the get-go that she’s looking for problems. This is by no means a thorough analysis of sexual assault trials in Canada – the good, the bad and the ugly. It’s merely pointing to problematic cases and telling us what Craig views as wrong with them.

She continues: “A legal system in which more than nine out of every ten sexual assaults receive no legal scrutiny is a profoundly dysfunctional legal system” – p. 22. This is profoundly incorrect. Firstly, she’s already established that nine out of ten assaults go unreported. Second, even if she’s referring to the remaining ten percent, again, the fault for sexual violence does not lie squarely at the feet of the justice system – not by a long shot. There can be a million other reasons why nine out of every ten sexual assaults (alleged and/or actual) receive no legal scrutiny (other than the lack of reporting), and many of them have nothing to do with the justice system. It is difficult to conceive how Professor Craig expects to be taken seriously – by anyone – and not as a shock jock. Oh, wait – she was cited at least twice last year by our country’s highest court.

She goes on and on about defence lawyers and their insidious efforts to “whack the complainant”. This is quite unfair. Yes, I am open to a nuanced discussion about the role of defence counsel (alongside other players in the justice system). Perhaps defence lawyers occasionally cross boundaries (ethical or otherwise), and she certainly goes to great pains to suggest that this is a regular occurrence. She neglects to mention that the system is quite human: prosecutors, judges, and academics are also not immune to biases and to overstepping boundaries. Many would agree that a breach of any obligation by a prosecutor or judge towards the accused is a far greater crime than a defence lawyer being (perhaps) too harsh while cross examining a complainant. This, of course, assumes great importance is given to the central tenet of the presumption of innocence in our criminal justice system – a tenet that Craig reluctantly pays lip service to.

Accused are generally in an unfortunate position. If they’re falsely accused (or not), they’re up against a system which is highly unfavourable: they’re typically less than sympathetic, they may have been denied bail for multiple months, their lawyer is an underpaid and overworked Legal Aid lawyer, and they sometimes show up to trial in prison clothes. Why would anyone expect them to have a fair trial?

Cross-examination is critical – particularly in the context of a sexual assault trial where the testimony of the opposing parties is often all there is. It is basically all the defence has – and the Crown has, assuming the presumption of innocence is not displaced. See, for example, para. 7 of R v Quintero-Gelvez, 2019 ABCA 17 (CanLII):

Cross-examination has been repeatedly described as a matter of fundamental importance that is integral to the conduct of a fair trial and a meaningful application of the presumption of innocence: see R v Osolin, 1993 CanLII 54 (SCC), [1993] 4 SCR 595 at pp 663-65. The principles of fundamental justice include the right to a fair trial and to make full answer and defence. A fair trial must be one which is perceived to have been conducted fairly; see R v Switzer, 2014 ABCA 129 at para 5.

Note that the Crown is by no means expected to “go gentle” on the accused. If the accused has the gall to testify, he or she can expect a rigorous (and yes – often, demeaning, degrading, etc.) cross-examination by the Crown. Of course, Craig would like it to be a one-way street – no-holds-barred on questioning the accused, but don’t step on anyone’s toes while questioning the complainant. Somehow, we’ll keep the presumption of innocence intact, as well.

She makes a decent point about aggression: “Beginning in law school and continuing throughout their professional development, lawyers (and in particular criminal lawyers) are socialized or even trained to value aggressive, unrelenting advocacy” (p. 98). I agree – it would certainly be nice if aggression were celebrated less in this profession. In the meantime, I don’t recommend criminal defence lawyers tone down the aggression – particularly if the Crown is ripping the head off the accused.

Many of her other points are just stupid. We should get rid of the big portraits of the Queen in courthouses – see page 184. Reduce legalese in the courtroom (not a bad idea, actually). Complainants should be allowed to sit during their testimony (there’s really no reason why they won’t be, and judges routinely allow them this courtesy). All sexual assault decisions should be reported – as in reported in CanLII. Judges need tons of education about rape myths (read: reminders about how badly their career will go if they’re caught saying the wrong thing to the complainant) … Not surprisingly, some of her ideas about mandated judicial education are currently being paraded about in Parliament.

SB and Ghomeshi

I don’t want to get into extensive discussions about some of the cases and transcripts she reviews. Suffice it to say that she presents a very skewed version of what happened, all in an attempt to make her points. For example:

In R v B(S) the section 276 ruling…was even worse…SB was acquitted and the Crown appealed. The Newfoundland Court of Appeal found that the use of evidence of the complainant’s other sexual activity in this case gratuitously denigrated and humiliated the complainant, and triggered the discriminatory twin myths in front of the jury” (p. 51).

She spends a considerable amount of time going through much of the transcript, in an effort to show the depths to which senior defence counsel in that case resorted to in questioning the complainant. Conspicuously absent is any mention of the fact that the complainant had lied quite seriously on the stand, and it was a large part of the reason why the majority of the Court of Appeal upheld the acquittal. For reference, in R. v S.B., 2016 NLCA 20 (CanLII), the majority of the Court of Appeal found that, although defence counsel had gone too far in its defence of the accused, the lies said by the complainant were sufficient enough to not order a new trial (see para. 86). Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court of Canada (in a one-line judgment of a unanimous 7-panel forum, at R. v. S.B., 2017 SCC 16 (CanLII)), disagreed with that result, and sided with the minority opinion. I would be interested to know the result of the retrial – on the off chance that the Crown went ahead with it. In any event, the main takeaway from the case should be “BAD DEFENCE LAWYER” and not “holy crap – that complainant was unable to say the truth if her life depended on it”. Her discussion of the Wagar case (unfortunately not a reported decision, but appealed at R v Wagar, 2015 ABCA 327 (CanLII), and subject to much media and academic criticism – incidentally the result was correct and the language used arguably was, as well – the 1,000-page transcript can be found here and the subsequent acquittal at the retrial here) and many others is similar.

She skims over the R. v. Ghomeshi, 2016 ONCJ 155 (CanLII) brouhaha:

To be clear, the much-discussed cross-examinations of the complainants in R v Ghomeshi did not appear from the transcripts to involve the types of practices examined in the previous chapter and later in this chapter. While the trial process was profoundly traumatic for the women who testified against Ghomeshi, defence counsel’s conduct of the case is not to blame for their experiences (pp. 62-63).

Craig otherwise glosses over this important trial, and does not mention the intense media and public criticism of the decision (not to mention the reprehensible legislation that arose as a direct result of it). Do you know who else the trial was profoundly traumatic for? The accused person. Oh, and if defence counsel is not to blame for the trauma experienced by the women who testified against Ghomeshi, who is? Their own foolishness? Or perhaps the abject failure of our criminal justice system to automatically believe complainants and convict those accused of sexual assault without bothering to pester complainants with the “traumatic” process of a trial?

For a thoughtful analysis of the Ghomeshi decision, see Joshua Sealy-Harrington’s thorough post in Ablawg (July 2022 edit: I criticize it subsequently here). Also, see Kyla Lee’s excellent blog post.

Rape Myths

Regarding the substantive content of “rape shield legislation” and our sexual assault laws, I have several concerns with these. While she relies on these in making some of her points, they are problematic for a number of reasons, and I’ll address those briefly now.

For example, see L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s dissent in R. v. Osolin, 1993 CanLII 54 (SCC):

They include myths that deem certain types of women “unrapable” and others, because of their occupations or previous sexual history, unworthy of belief. These myths suggest that women by their behaviour or appearance may be responsible for the occurrence of sexual assault. They suggest that drug use or dependence on social assistance are relevant to the issue of credibility as to consent. They suggest that the presence of certain emotional reactions and immediate reporting of the assault, despite all of the barriers that might discourage such reports, lend credibility to the assault report, whereas the opposite reactions lead to the conclusion that the complainant must be fabricating the event. Furthermore, they are built on the suggestion that women, out of spite, fickleness or fantasy and despite the obvious trauma for victims in many, if not most, sexual assault trials, are inclined to lie about sexual assault. The net result has been that sexual assaults are, and continue to be, underreported and underprosecuted; furthermore, the level of convictions that result in those cases that do reach the courts is significantly lower than for other offences. [Emphasis added.]

See also L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s dissent in R. v. Seaboyer; R. v. Gayme, 1991 CanLII 76 (SCC):

Sixty percent of those who tried reasoning with their attackers, and 60% of those who resisted actively by fighting or using weapon [sic] were injured. Every sexual assault incident is unique and so many factors are unknown (physical size of victims and offenders, verbal or physical threats, etc.) that no single course of action can be recommended unqualifiedly.

In practice, this leads to the absurd result that no reaction of a complainant can be assessed or criticized. How dare we assume what a reasonable reaction should have been?

L’Heureux-Dubé J. continues:

Reporting Rape. Two conflicting expectations exist concerning the reporting of rape. One is that if a woman is raped she will be too upset and ashamed to report it, and hence most of the time this crime goes unreported. The other is that if a woman is raped she will be so upset that she will report it. Both expectations exist simultaneously. […]
Woman as Fickle and Full of Spite. Another stereotype is that the feminine character is especially filled with malice. Woman is seen as fickle and as seeking revenge on past lovers. […]
Disputing That Sex Occurred. That females fantasize rape is another common stereotype. Females are assumed to make up stories that sex occurred when in fact nothing happened. . . . Similarly, women are thought to fabricate the sexual activity not as part of a fantasy life, but out of spite.

I assume the basis for the “rape myth” that women lie about sexual assault stems from these clearly highly-researched points from L’Heureux-Dubé J. Notwithstanding the fact that this particular “myth” appears to be demonstrably true, it continues to have a firm grip on our Canadian criminal justice system.

It is said (and apparently it’s a “rape myth”) that people routinely lie about sexual assault. See an article titled: 1 in 7 sexual assault cases in 2017 deemed ‘unfounded’: StatsCan:

Last year, 14 per cent of sexual assaults reported to police were given the “unfounded” classification, down from 19 per cent in 2016. The figure is double the seven per cent of unfounded cases identified among all criminal incidents in Canada last year.

See Statistics Canada:

Nationally, the proportion of sexual assaults deemed unfounded decreased in 2017

In 2017, 14% of sexual assaults (levels 1, 2, and 3) reported to police were classified as unfounded, down from 19% in 2016 (Table 2; Chart 3) (see Text box 1).Note A heightened awareness about sexual assaults and how they are classified may have had an impact on how other types of incidents were classified in 2017. For example, the proportion of physical assaults (levels 1, 2, and 3) classified as unfounded also decreased, though to a lesser extent (from 11% in 2016 to 9% in 2017) (Table 3; Chart 3).

These numbers make articles like this quite difficult to understand: Dispelling the myths about sexual assault:

Myth: Women lie and make up stories about being sexually assaulted.

Fact: The number of false reports for sexual assault is very low, consistent with the number of false reports for other crimes in Canada. Sexual assault carries such a stigma that many women prefer not to report.

Perhaps L’Heureux-Dubé J. was writing in the ’90s, before the prevalence of the internet, and possibly the numbers were different back then and/or more difficult to confirm. Or she made stuff up. Either way, I have trouble understanding why it continues to be currently considered good law.

A good example of a recent case that attempts to carefully consider the law along with the testimony of the witnesses at trial is R. v. J.E., 2019 NLSC 231 (CanLII). Incidentally, the Justice in this case happens to be Justice Stack, who is harshly criticized by Craig in her book, for his reasoning in the S.B. case.

Moldofsky Law

Tag Archives: statistics

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Prior consistent statements, bad character, s. 276, rape myths and conviction rates

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Book Review: Putting Trials on Trial: Sexual Assault and the Failure of the Legal Profession

Experienced in Vigourously Defending Alberta's Criminal Laws